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An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Mitigation in Capital Sentencing in North Carolina 
Before and After McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 
Janine Kremling 
ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on the influence of mitigating circumstances on the sentencing 
outcome before and after the McKoy (1990) decision. In McKoy (1990) the Supreme Court 
decided that the jurors did not have to find mitigating circumstances unanimously. Results 
are reported based on a sample of North Carolina first-degree murder cases where the state 
sought the death penalty. Logistic regression is used to determine the importance of 
mitigating circumstances as predictors of jury decision-making in North Carolina, 
controlling for the variety of other factors that influence that decision. 
The descriptive statistics show that the average number of mitigating circumstances 
submitted and accepted had doubled in the post-McKoy cases. At the same time, the 
number of aggravating circumstances presented and submitted stayed about the same. The 
analysis then moved to the consideration of the impact of mitigating circumstances, and 
whether there had been a change between the two eras. Separate logistic regression analysis 
revealed that there had indeed been a shift in the effects of aggravation and mitigation, but 
no in the manner that might have been anticipated, Specifically, in the post-McKoy era, 
mitigating circumstances had a diminished impact on the probability of a death sentence 
while, conversely, aggravating circumstances carried an increased impact. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction and Statement of the Research Issue 
 
Introduction 
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court (hereafter referred to as the “Court”) 
decided in the historical Furman v. Georgia (1972) case that capital punishment statutes 
allowing unguided discretion were unconstitutional because they produced arbitrary and 
capricious sentencing outcomes. Four years later, the Court ruled that mandatory death 
penalty statutes were also unconstitutional because they did not allow for individualized 
sentencing (Woodson v. North Carolina, 1976). Since then, 36 states have incorporated 
systems of capital punishment that employ different versions of a guided discretion 
model that was approved in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) and, in somewhat different form, in 
Proffitt v. Florida (1976). Texas and Oregon utilize yet another guided discretion model 
approved in Jurek v. Texas (1976). 
 From 1976 until today, the Court has focused on two principles regarding capital 
punishment that are part of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. First, discretion must be guided so that the group of death-eligible persons is 
narrowed. Second, the sentencer must consider all mitigating evidence and allow for 
individualized sentencing that hypothetically takes into account the full context in which 
the crime occurred (Kirchmeier, 1998, p. 3).  The general trend of Court decisions has 
been to systematically increase the discretion of jurors regarding mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances, both of which are key elements in the guided discretion 
models employed in capital murder cases (i.e., those eligible for the death penalty) during 
the penalty phase of the trial. Briefly, aggravating circumstances are situations 
established through state legislation by which a murder becomes eligible for the death 
penalty, and states vary considerably in the number and types of situations that are 
statutorily defined (Coyne and Entzeroth, 2001, p. 329). In contrast, mitigating factors are 
circumstances presented by defendants, the purpose of which is to argue that they should 
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be spared the death penalty. In most states, if one or more statutory aggravators are found 
to exist, they must be “weighed” against mitigating circumstances. However, the Court 
has not specified any rules on how to weigh aggravating against mitigating factors, so 
jurors (or, in some states, judges) are left with rather broad discretion in their decision to 
give the defendant a life or death sentence. 
 One of these Court decisions was McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) whereby the 
Court ruled that jurors do not have to be unanimous in deciding whether any specific 
mitigating factor should be taken in account during punishment deliberations. This ruling 
was particularly important to the North Carolina system of capital punishment because 
juries have the final sentencing authority. The result of McKoy was to overturn a number 
of death sentences in North Carolina and, of longer-term consequence, to mandate a new 
procedure in which jurors respond to mitigating factors presented by the defense. The 
essence of this change was that jurors no longer had to agree unanimously that a specific 
mitigating factor existed in responding “yes” on an “Issues and Recommendation” form 
that juries are required to complete as a record of their deliberations regarding sentencing. 
The revised procedure that remains in use today simply requires that one or more jurors 
believes that a mitigating factor exists for the jury to answer “yes” on the form. In effect, 
the meaning of a “yes” response has changed; in its extreme ramification, a lone juror 
rejecting a mitigator prior to McKoy would have resulted in a “no” being recorded, while 
after McKoy, a lone juror accepting a mitigator would mandate a “yes” being recorded. 
Background to the McKoy Case 
A bit of background on the McKoy case may be helpful in understanding how the 
case unfolded. Dock McKoy, Jr. (also known by several aliases), age 65, was a resident 
living outside of Wadesboro in Anson County, North Carolina. On the afternoon of 
December 22, 1984, the Anson County Sheriff’s office received reports that McKoy was 
discharging a firearm outside his house in an area that was dangerously close to other 
residents. Two deputies responded, conferred with the person calling in the complaint, 
and then talked with McKoy. Noting that he was highly intoxicated, they asked him to 
stop the shooting. A short time later, two other deputies were sent back to McKoy’s 
house because of complaints that the shooting had resumed. When the officers arrived, 
McKoy retreated inside his house, rejected their requests that he come outside, and 
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threatened to kill them if they did not leave. Other officers began to arrive, and one 
deputy walked to the back of McKoy’s house to see if entry could be gained. 
Unexpectedly, McKoy pushed open his screen door and fired a shot at Deputy Kress 
Horne, who was braced against a patrol car. The shot hit Deputy Horne in the face, a 
wound from which he died later that evening. A brief gun battle broke out between 
McKoy and the officers on site, finally ending when a wounded McKoy surrendered. 
Because of intense publicity in the relatively small county, McKoy’s trial was 
moved to neighboring Stanly County. The state announced that it would seek the death 
penalty, and following McKoy’s conviction for first degree murder, presented two 
aggravating circumstances, both of which the jury accepted: (1) that McKoy had been 
previously convicted of a felony involving violence to the person (he had been convicted 
of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon in 1977, crimes for which he served five 
years in prison), and (2) that the murder was against a law enforcement officer 
performing his professional duties. The defense presented seven mitigators, including a 
“catch-all” factor that allowed the jury to consider any other mitigating factor it believed 
warranted consideration (as mandated in Locket v. Ohio [1978]). A unanimous vote was 
required to indicate acceptance of each mitigator, resulting in the jury indicating “yes” to 
two mitigators, “no” to four others presented by the defense, and indicating in response to 
the “catch-all” that they had no other mitigators they wished to consider. On August 8, 
1985, the jury returned a sentence of death. 
In their appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, McKoy’s attorneys raised a 
number of issues, many of which centered on his intoxicated state at the time of the 
offense. One appeal, however, questioned whether requiring unanimity from juries in 
accepting mitigating factors led to jurors believing that they could not consider that factor 
when they made their individual decisions regarding the sentence. In other words, the 
question raised was whether the unanimity requirement could lead to a single dissenting 
juror neutralizing a strong feeling among others that a specific mitigator (especially 
McKoy’s intoxication) should be taken into account. The charge was that jurors might 
interpret this guideline to mean that they could not take this factor into account when 
making their individual decision for a life or death sentence. The North Carolina justices 
were not persuaded by this, or any of the other arguments presented on appeal, and thus 
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upheld McKoy’s conviction and death sentence (State of North Carolina v. Dock McKoy, 
Jr., 1988). 
McKoy’s attorneys continued to press his appeals, and eventually got a hearing 
before the U.S. Supreme Court. There, basing their argument on the recent Court decision 
in Mills v. Maryland (1988), they pressed the argument that their client might have 
received a death sentence because some jurors believed that they could not consider 
issues presented in the four mitigators that were not unanimously found by the jury. The 
state’s attorneys argued that North Carolina juries were not compelled to assess a death 
sentence even in the absence of finding any mitigators, and unlike the Maryland 
procedures struck down in Mills, the jury instructions made this clear. Ultimately, by a  
6-3 vote, the Court’s majority justices were persuaded by the arguments on behalf of 
McKoy. Although the Court upheld his conviction, it vacated McKoy’s death sentence 
and ordered a new sentencing phase trial (McKoy v. North Carolina, 1990). 
As an ironic ending to the case, Dock McKoy was declared incompetent to be 
retried because of his deteriorated mental condition following long-term alcohol abuse. 
Now 84 years old, he remains incarcerated as of this writing. The North Carolina 
Department of Correction website indicates that his current status is no longer a matter of 
public record, suggesting that he is confined to the mentally disabled ward of the state’s 
main prison in Raleigh, North Carolina. 
Statement of the Research Issue 
 As will be discussed in the next chapter, a variety of Court decisions have 
demanded a somewhat standardized procedure of capital punishment that nevertheless 
allows for individualized sentencing decisions. That is, while seeking to eliminate 
arbitrariness (meant as the absence of legally relevant factors as predictors of death 
sentences), the Court recognizes that seemingly similar cases may have characteristics 
that will cause jurors (and, in some states, judges) to vary in the sentences they assign. 
This thesis addresses the question of whether the McKoy (1990) decision has influenced 
the way in which mitigating factors are considered by North Carolina capital juries. 
Specifically, a large sample of capital cases in North Carolina will be analyzed to 
determine whether there is a difference before and after the McKoy decision in the role of 
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mitigating factors in predicting juries’ sentencing recommendations. Three possibilities 
exist: 
(1)  There will be no difference in the two periods; 
(2)  Because unanimity was required pre-McKoy, mitigating factors will have a stronger 
influence; or 
(3)  If jurors were indeed dissuaded from considering mitigating factors unless there was 
juror unanimity, freeing them from this constraint might result in mitigating factors very 
significantly related to sentencing recommendations. 
Organization of the Study 
 To explore the issue of whether the McKoy decision affected the role of 
mitigation in North Carolina capital sentencing patterns, this study is organized in the 
following manner. Chapter 2 provides an evaluation of the decisions of the Court 
regarding its jurisprudence on how aggravating and mitigating circumstances are to be 
taken into consideration by the sentencer in order to avoid arbitrary death sentences. 
Included in this discussion are changes in case law that have influenced North Carolina’s 
death penalty system towards increased juror discretion. Against this background, I 
consider the extent to which the Court’s post-Furman jurisprudence may be inconsistent 
with its decision in Furman and Gregg that capital sentencing should be standardized to 
avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing outcomes. 
In Chapter 3, a review of the empirical literature is presented regarding issues of 
arbitrariness in capital punishment decision making after Furman (1972). During the past 
30 years, researchers have conducted extensive research that addresses whether continued 
arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty exists. The general findings from 
this literature are discussed, with a special focus on the roles of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances as statistical predictors of sentencing outcomes. 
 Chapter 4 explains the methodology and statistical analysis of the current study, 
while the results of the study’s analyses are presented in Chapter 5.  Chapter 6 contains a 
discussion of the findings and their implications, and concludes the thesis with 
suggestions for further research in this area. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Legal History of Capital Punishment from Furman (1972) to McKoy (1990) 
 
In McGautha v. California (1971), the Court considered for the first time the 
constitutionality of unguided discretion in capital sentencing. In a 6-3 vote, the justices 
ruled that unguided discretion models do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause. However, only a year later, the Court appeared to reverse itself in the case 
of Furman v. Georgia (1972) when a deeply divided court ruled 5-4 that the then-current 
practice of capital punishment was unconstitutional. Even though the five majority 
justices issued separate opinions, a common thread across their discussions was that the 
death penalty was administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner due to the 
unfettered discretion granted to capital juries. They emphasized an underlying premise 
that “death [sentencing] is different.” They believed that the arbitrariness and 
capriciousness that seemed to characterize Georgia’s death sentencing was unacceptable. 
Consequently, the prevailing opinion was that the decisions of the sentencer must be 
guided by clear rules so as to create a standardized sentencing model. The primary 
requirements for those states wishing to resume capital punishment were to “channel the 
sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed 
guidance and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of 
death“ (Furman v. Georgia, p. 428) and to narrow the class of offenders that are death 
eligible. In regards to narrowing the group of offenders eligible for death sentencing, the 
justices wanted to overcome the problem of  “overinclusion,” meaning the failure to 
differentiate those whose crimes most merited the death penalty from those whose crimes 
were of a less egregious nature (Striker and Steiker, 2003). 
 Following the Furman (1972) decision, most state legislatures rewrote their 
capital punishment procedures. In 1976, several different approaches came before the 
Supreme Court. In Gregg v. Georgia (1976), Jurek v. Texas (1976), and Proffitt v. 
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Florida (1976) the Court approved, by 7-2 votes, three separate guided discretion models. 
All three employed a bifurcated trial procedure whereby separate guilt and sentencing 
phases of the trial were conducted. In the penalty phase, aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances were to be considered in order to guide the sentencer’s discretion and 
thereby eliminate arbitrary and capricious sentencing decisions.1 These models also 
provided guidance in narrowing the class of death-eligible offenses by limiting death 
eligibility to first-degree murders with at least one aggravating circumstance, and 
required a proportionality review to discern whether a given death sentence was 
proportionate compared to other similar cases. In approving these models, the majority 
justices were optimistic that the concern for fairness expressed in Furman (1972) four 
years earlier would be adequately addressed. 
While the guided discretion models were declared constitutional, mandatory death 
penalty models introduced by Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) and Roberts v. 
Louisiana (1976) were rejected and said to violate the Eighth Amendment. The reasoning 
of the Court was that mandatory schemes provided no guidance to the sentencer, did not 
address the problem of overinclusion, and did not allow for the consideration of the 
character of the crime and the defendant. The Court was also concerned with jury 
nullification, which refers to the reluctance of juries to convict defendants whom they 
believe to be guilty, but not deserving of death (Coyne and Entzeroth, 2001). 
Interestingly, the decisions of the Court in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, and those in 
Woodson and Roberts, are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the Court required 
standardized sentencing in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek to address the concerns raised in 
Furman; on the other hand, the Court rejected Woodson and Roberts because the statutes 
did not allow for more individualized sentencing. Critics have said that a precedent was 
set in favor of individualized sentencing, and the Court’s focus shifted from guided 
discretion to simply narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants (Kirchmeier, 1998). 
In most states, including North Carolina, as long as jurors find at least one statutory 
aggravating factor to exist, they have broad discretion to return either a life or a death 
sentence. 
Subsequent decisions of the Court make this contradiction more evident. Two 
years after Gregg and Woodson, Lockett v. Ohio (1978) increased the discretion of the 
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sentencer when the Court ruled that any mitigating circumstance supported by the 
evidence can be submitted by the defense, not just those specified in the state’s capital 
punishment statutes. This decision was confirmed and expanded in Eddings v. Oklahoma 
(1982) when the Court held that the sentencer cannot refuse to take into account any 
mitigating factor supported by the evidence. The rulings in Lockett and Eddings drew on 
Woodson and Roberts in specifying that sentencing must be individualized and related to 
the culpability of the offender, but appeared contrary to the Furman and Gregg decisions 
that standardized discretion models must channel discretion. Sundby (1991) argues that 
the ultimate impact of the Lockett decision, however unintended, was to provide capital 
juries with an increased opportunity to make the kinds of arbitrary and capricious 
sentencing decisions that were objected to in Furman. 
In three decisions in 1983, the Court further expanded the discretion of capital 
juries regarding their consideration of aggravating circumstances. The decisions in 
Stephens v. Zant (1983), Barclay v. Florida (1983), and California v. Ramos (1983), 
provided juries with more flexibility to return a death sentence by expanding the scope of 
aggravating factors that could be considered. In Zant, the Court decided that a death 
sentence is constitutional even if one of the several aggravating circumstances found by 
the jury is later held to be invalid (but, at least one must be valid). The Court also allowed 
the consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances if the jury unanimously 
found at least one statutory aggravating factor to exist. However, the decision’s impact 
was limited to states where the jury did not have to “weigh” aggravating against 
mitigating factors. In Barclay, the Court closed the hole that it had left open in Zant when 
it stated that if there are other valid aggravating factors, one invalid aggravating 
circumstance does not support the claim of a new sentencing hearing even when the jury 
or judge is supposed to weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating 
circumstances. Further expanding discretion, the Court ruled in Ramos that jurors are 
allowed to consider unrelated aggravating factors, such as a possibility of a commutation 
from a life sentence without the possibility of parole to a life sentence with the possibility 
of parole, in their final sentencing decisions. 
Critics such as Justice Thurgood Marshall have said that the decisions in Locket/ 
Eddings and Zant/Barclay/Ramos served to undermine a fair and consistent sentencing 
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procedure and violated the Furman requirement of guided discretion. Justice Marshall 
expressed this concern in his dissent from the Zant decision by saying that "[o]nce [the 
threshold] finding [of one statutory aggravating circumstance] is made, the jurors can be 
left completely at large, with nothing to guide them but their whims and prejudices" (Zant 
v. Stephens, 1983, p. 2760). 
The growing discretion that alarmed Justice Marshall was widened even further in 
Mills v. Maryland (1988) when the Court removed the barrier of jury unanimity in 
considering mitigating circumstances. Mills reaffirmed and expanded Lockett by ruling 
that the vote of a single juror is sufficient to find the existence of a mitigating factor. 
More precisely, that juror cannot be prevented from taking that mitigator into account 
when making the sentencing decision, even if others on the jury elect not to do so. 
Importantly for the present research, the Mills (1988) decision was the basis for a 
change in North Carolina’s death penalty statute. Two years later, the appeal of Dock 
McKoy was ruled on. A key element of the appeal had been to use Mills to challenge 
North Carolina’s requirement that each mitigating factor being considered by the jury 
must be approved unanimously. Attorneys for the state argued that what distinguished 
North Carolina from Maryland was that the North Carolina statute clearly stated that the 
jury was not required to impose a death sentence when no mitigating evidence was found 
to exist. Contrary to North Carolina, the sentencing instructions in Maryland were so 
ambiguous that they may have misled the jury to believe that finding no mitigators 
mandated a death sentence. 
In a 6-3 decision, the justices rejected the state’s argument in McKoy v. North 
Carolina (1990) and ruled that “North Carolina’s unanimity requirement impermissibly 
limits jurors’ consideration of mitigating evidence and hence is contrary to this Court’s 
decision in Mills” (McKoy v. North Carolina, 1990, p. 2). The majority of justices argued 
that it was unconstitutional for one holdout juror to prevent the other jurors from 
considering mitigating evidence, especially since this may inadvertently slant the 
subsequent decision toward a death. 
Justice Antoine Scalia delivered the dissenting opinion of the court, one which 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra O’Connor joined. These justices 
agreed that the State must guide the sentencers’ discretion and provide the opportunity to 
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rationally assess their decision in order to return a death or a life sentence. However, they 
believed that “there is little guidance in a system that requires each individual juror to 
bring to the ultimate decision his own idiosyncratic notion of what facts are mitigating, 
untempered by the discipline of group deliberation and agreement” (McKoy v. North 
Carolina, 1990, p. 21). They believed that a capital jury is supposed to return a final 
sentence as a “body” that deliberates and decides together the appropriate sentence. Their 
dissent expressed concern that McKoy will separate the jurors and force them to reach an 
isolated decision, an outcome not supported by Lockett (1978), Eddings (1982), or Mills 
(1988). In sum, the McKoy decision, according to the dissenting justices, violated the 
rules of guided discretion, thereby undermining “sound jury deliberations” (McKoy v. 
North Carolina, 1990, p. 23). 
The pragmatic effect for North Carolina was to immediately alter the wording of 
Issue Two in the Issues and Recommendation Sheet that juries must complete as a record 
of their deliberations. The wording was changed to (and remains) the following 
instruction: “Do you find from the evidence the existence of one or more of the following 
mitigating circumstances?” followed by “Before you answer Issue Two, consider each of 
the following mitigating circumstances. In the space after each mitigating circumstance, 
write ‘yes,’ if one or more of you [my emphasis] finds that circumstance by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Write ‘no’ if none of you find that mitigating 
circumstance.” This replaced the wording that was in effect: “Do you unanimously find 
from the evidence the existence of one or more of the following mitigating 
circumstances?” followed by “Before you answer Issue Two, consider each of the 
following mitigating circumstances. In the space after each mitigating circumstance, 
write ‘yes,’ if you unanimously find that mitigating circumstances by the preponderance 
of the evidence. Write ‘no,’ if you do not unanimously find that mitigating circumstance 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”2 
As a result of the McKoy ruling, all individuals who received a death sentence 
under the unanimity requirement had their death sentences remanded. However, those 
cases where the jury unanimously accepted all submitted mitigators were not considered 
to have the basis for an appeal. A review of death sentences prior to McKoy revealed that 
41 individuals whose cases were originally upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court 
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had their sentences remanded for retrial (Rhee, 1993). Of these, my analysis shows that 
24 received death sentences in subsequent re-trials of the sentencing phase using the new 
guidelines. 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Court’s concern in Furman was 
that the death penalty was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. With its 
decisions following Gregg (1976), the Court may have opened the doors once again for 
unfettered discretion and invited exactly the arbitrary decision making that was the focal 
concern of Furman. In reality, subsequent rulings have created a situation where there is 
not much guidance left for jurors, because they can consider anything in mitigation and 
anything in aggravation, as long as one statutory aggravating factor is found exist. 
What has emerged in practice from this situation? A large body of empirical 
literature has been devoted to patterns of capital sentencing following the resumption of 
executions in 1977. The next chapter reviews this literature to determine whether 
arbitrariness and capriciousness remain as part of the contemporary character of death 
sentencing in the United States. 
Endnotes 
 1The differences in the models are as follows: 
(Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, p. 1) - The new Georgia “statutory provisions with 
regard to imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder and other offenses, (1) 
guilt or innocence is determined, either by a jury or the trial judge, in the first stage of a 
bifurcated trial, with the judge being required to charge the jury as to any lesser included 
offenses when supported by the evidence, (2) after a verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, a 
presentence hearing is conducted, where the jury (or judge in a case tried without a jury) 
hears argument and additional evidence in mitigation or aggravation of punishment, (3) at 
least one of ten aggravating circumstances specified in the statutes must be found to exist 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and must be designated in writing, before the jury (or judge) 
may impose the death sentence on a defendant convicted of murder, the trial judge in jury 
cases being bound by the jury's recommended sentence, (4) on automatic appeal of a 
death sentence, the Supreme Court of Georgia must determine whether the sentence was 
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, whether 
the evidence supported the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether 
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the death sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar 
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, and (5) if a death sentence is 
affirmed, the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court must include reference to similar 
cases that the court considered“. 
(Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, p. 1) - Under the new Texas statutes, (1) capital homicides 
are limited to intentional and knowing murders committed in the five specified situations 
of murder of a peace officer or fireman, murder committed in the course of kidnapping, 
burglary, robbery, forcible rape, or arson, murder committed while escaping or 
attempting to escape from a penal institution, murder committed for remuneration, and 
murder committed by a prison inmate when the victim is a prison employee; (2) if a 
defendant is convicted of a capital offense, a separate presentence hearing must be held 
before the jury, where any relevant evidence may be introduced and arguments may be 
presented for or against the death sentence; (3) the jury must answer the questions (a) 
whether the defendant's conduct that caused the death was committed deliberately and 
with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result, (b) 
whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing threat to society, and (c) if raised by the evidence, 
whether the defendant's conduct in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to 
the provocation, if any, by the deceased; (4) if the jury finds that the state has proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to each of the pertinent questions is yes, then 
the death sentence is imposed, but if the jury finds that the answer to any question is no, 
then a sentence of life imprisonment results; and (5) death sentences are given expedited 
review on appeal”. 
(Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, p. 1) -  “Under the new Florida statutes, (1) if a 
defendant is found guilty of first-degree murder, a separate presentence hearing is held 
before the jury, where arguments may be presented and where any evidence deemed 
relevant to sentencing may be admitted and must include matters relating to eight 
aggravating and seven mitigating circumstances specified in the statutes, (2) the jury is 
directed to weigh such circumstances and return an advisory verdict as to the sentence, to 
be determined by a majority vote, (3) the actual sentence is determined by the trial judge, 
who is also directed to weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, (4) 
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if a death sentence is imposed, the trial court must set forth in writing its fact findings that 
sufficient statutory aggravating circumstances exist and are not outweighed by statutory 
mitigating circumstances, and (5) a death sentence is automatically reviewed by the 
Supreme Court of Florida, which considers its function to be to guarantee that the 
aggravating and mitigating reasons present in one case will reach a similar result to that 
reached under similar circumstances in another case.” 
 As a note, the capital punishment statutes ultimately adopted by the North 
Carolina legislature seems to be consistent with the Florida statute developed in Profitt. 
However, one major exception exists in that that the judge has no authority to overturn a 
jury decision in North Carolina; in essence, the jury is the sentencer in North Carolina 
while final authority rests with the trial judge in Florida. 
 2The form in place at the time came about through a North Carolina Supreme 
Court decision, State of North Carolina v. Clinton Rondale Kirkley (1983), in which a 
revision of the original post-Gregg Issues and Recommendation form was ordered. The 
essence of the revision was that the state, in Issue Two, had been submitting mitigating 
factors as a group. The jury had to indicate whether or not it unanimously found one or 
more of them to exist, but did not require the jury to indicate which mitigators it did, or 
did not, approve. The Kirkley decision led to a revised form that required unanimous 
approval for each separate mitigator. This revised form was the object of appeal in the 
McKoy decision.
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Chapter Three 
 
Research on the Administration of the Death Penalty in the United States in the  
Post-Gregg Era 
 
Researchers have conducted many studies since the re-instatement of capital 
punishment in Gregg v. Georgia (1976).  The major part of research has focused on 
whether the issues raised in Furman v. Georgia (1972) have been addressed, namely the 
presence of arbitrariness (the absence of legal factors as predictors of death sentencing) 
and discrimination (whether non-legal factors are found as predictors). The United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO) analyzed 28 studies that had been conducted in the 
first decade post-Gregg, and attempted to summarize the findings emanating from this 
body of research. The ensuing report (GAO, 1990) concluded that even though the 
studies varied in their method and overall quality, a consistent finding was that factors 
related to aggravation were significant predictors of death sentences, although their 
relative weights varied considerably among the states that were sources of the data. 
Interestingly, the report was not as explicit in its assessment of mitigation in predicting 
death sentencing. What may have contributed to this absence is that a number of the 
studies reviewed in the GAO report did not include some aspect of mitigation as part of 
the analysis.1 
The following sections concentrate on subsequent literature not covered in the 
GAO (1990) report because of the issue of arbitrariness, specifically how a change in 
North Carolina juries’ consideration of mitigation may have changed its role in predicting 
death sentences, The discussion is divided into two sections, one concentrating on 
research that included mitigating factors in the analysis and the other on those studies 
which considered both aggravating and mitigating factors as legal factors in predicting 
death sentences. 
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Research on the Issue of Arbitrariness: Aggravating Factors 
Almost all death penalty studies since the GAO (1990) report have examined the 
impact of aggravating circumstances on sentencing outcomes, treating them as legally 
relevant variables that should be expected to influence those decisions. Some researchers 
have included separate aggravators accepted by juries as dummy variables while others 
have employed aggravating factors as a summed variable (the number of aggravating 
circumstances found by the jury). Also, a few researchers have created a so-called 
culpability index as a method for grouping cases on a seriousness scale. The researchers 
then compared the sentencing outcomes of “similar” cases (proportionality review).  The 
vast majority of recent studies including aggravating factors as dummy variables find that 
certain single aggravating circumstances can significantly influence the outcome of 
capital trials. Klein and Rolph’s (1991) study in California showed that murders 
involving the victim being subjected to sodomy led to a death sentence in 92% of the 
cases and murders that included torture led to a death sentence in 100% of the cases. 
Other aggravating circumstances that significantly increased the probability of a death 
sentence were murder to avoid arrest, murder for pecuniary gain, and prior prison record. 
Keil and Vito (1995), analyzing death sentencing in Kentucky, included four 
legally relevant variables (felony circumstances, multiple victims, silenced victim 
[murder to avoid prosecution]) in their analysis. They also included a variable for “case 
seriousness” that indicated whether more than one aggravating circumstance existed. The 
results indicated that multiple victims, silenced victim, and case seriousness all 
significantly influenced penalty trial outcomes towards a death sentence. However, the 
authors found evidence that juries treated aggravating circumstances differently 
depending on the race of the defendant and the race of the victim, namely that black 
defendants who killed a white victim were more likely to receive a death sentence. 
Brock, Cohen, and Sorensen (2000) found in Texas that felony circumstances (the 
murder was committed in the course of another crime) were the best predictor of a death 
sentence. Among the felony circumstances, sexual assault was overrepresented among 
death sentences. The probability of a death sentence was also higher for multiple 
offenders, multiple victims, murders by strangers, and murders by men. Additionally, 
physical weakness of a victim (females, children, elderly) also increased the probability 
 16
of a death sentence. Further, Brock et al. created a scale of case seriousness that included 
felonies by strangers, death by weapons other than guns, multiple victims, and 
helplessness of the victim when murdered. The scale was created by assigning scores 
based on the existence or absence on these four factors. The authors were able to show 
that with an increasing level of case seriousness the probability of a death sentence also 
increased.  In other work, a study by Holcomb and Williams (2001) in Ohio found that 
felony circumstances (the murder committed in the course of another crime) were the 
best predictor of a death sentence, along with multiple victims being murdered. Similarly, 
Pierce and Radelet’s (2002) study of Illinois showed that prior murder record, felony 
circumstances, and multiple victims were significantly related to a death sentence. 
 Even though the studies discussed here employed very different methodologies 
and were based on research in different states, a general finding to emerge is that felony 
circumstances, prior violent record, and multiple victims were consistently and 
significantly related to death sentencing. However, based on the model to emerge from 
the Gregg decision and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court rulings, mitigating circumstances 
must also be considered as legal factors that can legitimately influence sentencing 
decisions. Therefore, the next section will review studies that have assessed the influence 
of both mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances in determining predictors of 
death sentencing. 
Research on the Issue of Arbitrariness: Both Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
In 1990, Baldus, Woodworth, and Pulaski published a now-famous study about 
the administration of the death penalty in Georgia.2 In their Procedural Reform Study 
(PRS), Baldus and his colleagues compared the administration of the death penalty in 
Georgia before and after Furman. They found that the probability of a death sentence 
increased with an increasing number of accepted aggravating circumstances. However, 
the death sentencing rate for the most aggravated cases was only .63. The authors 
concluded that “the statutorily designated aggravating circumstances in Georgia’s post-
Furman law do not serve in practice to distinguish murder cases in which death sentences 
are routinely imposed from those that normally result in a life sentence” (Baldus et al., 
1990, p. 97).  
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Additionally, Baldus et al. (1990) discovered that single statutory and non-
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances had a significant influence on the 
sentencing outcome.4 An important component of their analyses of whether Georgia’s 
death penalty operates arbitrarily was the construction of a “culpability scale” that 
included seventeen legitimate factors (aggravating and mitigating circumstances). The 
culpability index consisted of five levels: 1) “very mitigated,” 2) “some mitigation,” 3) 
“neither aggravated nor mitigated,” 4) “some aggravation,” and 5) “very aggravated.” 
The hypothesis was that “in a random or highly capricious death-sentencing system, there 
would be little or no relationship between the perceived culpability of those sentenced 
and the sentences they received” (p. 59). The results suggested that the level of 
culpability was related to the sentencing outcome, namely the higher the level of 
culpability, the greater the probability of a death sentence. However, in the midrange of 
aggravation, the death sentencing rate varied between .08 and .80. This finding indicated 
to the authors that the death penalty in Georgia in the post-Furman era was not reserved 
for the most aggravated cases and that the death penalty was not being applied 
consistently. 
Baldus et al.’s (1990) analysis shows that even though the administration of the 
death penalty may be less arbitrary and more evenhandedly applied in the post-Furman 
era than in the pre-Furman era, legitimate case characteristics do not fully explain the 
sentencing outcome and death sentences are only applied evenhandedly in 50 to 60 
percent of all cases.4 In sum, the results imply that the Georgia death penalty system still 
operates in a somewhat arbitrary and excessive manner. 
In 1998, Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, and Broffitt published the 
results of another study, this one from the city of Philadelphia. The researchers used 
different methodologies to measure defendant culpability and their results suggested that 
aggravating factors significantly influenced juries’ decisions. In contrast, mitigating 
factors appeared to have little influence. In further work, a study of Nebraska capital 
sentencing by Baldus, Woodworth, Grosso, and Christ (2002) found support for their 
Philadelphia findings. Whereas six of the statutory aggravating circumstances were 
significantly related to sentencing outcomes, none of the statutory mitigating factors was 
significant.3 When the jury found one aggravating circumstance to exist, mitigation had a 
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slight effect. When the jury found two aggravating factors, the probability of a death 
sentence decreased when the number of mitigating factors increased. When a jury found 
three or more aggravating factors, mitigating factors did not matter. In sum, the influence 
of the number of mitigating factors on the sentencing outcome varied depending on the 
number of aggravating factors. Overall, aggravating factors had a much stronger 
influence on the sentencing outcome than mitigating circumstances. 
Unah and Boger (2001) conducted a later study in North Carolina that began with 
all murders in North Carolina during 1993 – 1997,5 analyzing the likelihood of a case 
receiving a death sentence at several levels of the criminal justice process (e.g., decision 
to charge first degree murder, decision to seek the death penalty, etc.).  For those cases 
that were tried capitally, the aggravating circumstances of prior violent felony, felony 
circumstances, killing of a law enforcement officer, an especially heinous killing, the 
murder posing a great risk to other persons, and violence against another victim were all 
found to be significantly related to a death sentence. Conversely, acceptance of two 
statutory mitigating factors, “capacity to appreciate criminality impaired” and 
“defendant’s age,” were significantly related to the defendant receiving a life sentence. 
The authors also created a variable “nonstatutory mitigating factors” and a variable 
“nonstatutory aggravating circumstance of victim”. Both variables were significantly 
related to the sentencing outcome. However, the authors provided no information as to 
which factors were counted as non-statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
More recently, Lenza, Keys, and Guess (2003) analyzed data from Missouri and 
found that prior convictions, an aggravating factor, had a significant effect on defendants 
receiving a death sentence. Age of the defendant (younger than 21), a mitigating factor, 
did not significantly decrease the probability of receiving a death sentence. Conversely, 
defendants younger than 30 years were more likely to be sentenced to death. The authors 
speculated that jurors saw young people as having less social value and therefore being 
more “executable” than older offenders. 
Paternoster (2003) concentrated mainly on the influence of geography and race of 
victim, as well as race of defendant, when he examined the application of the death 
penalty in Maryland. Paternoster used aggravating and mitigating circumstances as 
control variables to determine whether the capital punishment system of Maryland shows 
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discriminatory patterns. Numerous aggravating and mitigating circumstances had a 
significant influence on the sentencing outcome when estimating the effects of geography 
(counties). The influential statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors are “multiple 
victims,” “victim sexually abused,” “victim killed execution style,” and “prior felony 
conviction.” The influential statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were 
“defendant physically abused as a child” and “defendant made full confession to 
aggravating factors.” These aggravating and mitigating circumstances were also 
significantly related to the sentencing outcome when the effects of the defendant’s race 
were assessed. Additionally, the statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors of 
“defendant implicated in other killings,” “defendant forced his way into the place of the 
victim,” “victim suffered multiple traumas,” “victim killed execution style.” and 
“defendant tried to hide or dispose body” and the statutory and nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances “defendant had history of drug abuse,” “defendant sexually abused as a 
child” and “defendant confessed to aggravating circumstances” were significantly related 
to the sentencing outcome when effects of victim race were evaluated (Paternoster, 
2003). 
The Purpose of the Study Reiterated 
Although stated in Chapter 1, the foregoing discussion may have clarified the 
intended objectives of the present study. To reiterate, the purpose is to explore whether 
the Court’s McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) decision affected the role of mitigation in 
capital sentencing in North Carolina.  A large set of capital cases in North Carolina will 
be analyzed to determine whether there is a difference before and after the McKoy 
decision in the role of mitigating factors in predicting juries’ sentencing 
recommendations. A secondary consideration is whether the predictive models of death 
sentencing show less or more arbitrariness between the two periods. Three possibilities 
exist: 
(1)  There will be no difference in the two periods, with predictors of death sentencing 
being essentially the same during both time periods; 
(2)  Because unanimity was required pre-McKoy, mitigating factors will have a stronger 
influence; or 
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(3)  If jurors were indeed dissuaded from considering mitigating factors unless there was 
juror unanimity, freeing them from this constraint could enhance the relationships of 
mitigating factors with sentencing recommendations.    
Endnotes 
 1Another finding of the GAO report, one that received greater attention that the 
evidence concerning arbitrariness, was the consistent result that white victim cases were 
significantly more likely to receive a death sentence than those involving the murders of 
non-white victims. While the presence of non-legal factors is not a focus of the present 
research, variables are included as controls in the analysis that will allow for an 
assessment of their roles as predictors. 
 2This work was the centerpiece of the defense’s claim of systemic discrimination 
in the U.S. Supreme Court ruling McCleskey v. Kemp (1987). The findings showed that 
the murder victim being white was a statistically significant predictor of death sentencing 
in Georgia. While the legacy of this work is the finding concerning discrimination, the 
results contain valuable information about aggravation and mitigation. 
 3The six aggravating circumstances found to have a significant effect were 
“record of murder, terror, or serious assault,” “contract murder,” “murder was heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel,” “multiple victims,” “great risk of death to others,” and “murder as 
committed in an effort to conceal the commission of another crime.” 
 4The aggravating circumstances “murder committed during the course of another 
felony,” “previous convicted of violent crime,” “defendant created great risk of death to 
others,” “murder for money,” “murder for hire,” “murder wanton or vile” and “defendant 
was prisoner or escapee” (Baldus et al., 1990, p. 657). A number of mitigating 
circumstances was also significantly related to the sentencing outcome, namely 
“defendant 16 or younger,” “no conviction for a previous violent felony,” “defendant was 
underling in murder” and “defendant was provoked” (Baldus et al., 1990, pp. 656-657). 
 5Undoubtedly, the authors were cognizant of the fact that juries’ responses to 
mitigation had different meanings in years before the McKoy decision, so they elected to 
focus on cases during a relatively limited time span in the post-McKoy era. This study is 
available on-line as a report from the agency that sponsored the research, but, 
surprisingly, does not appear to have been published in a scholarly journal. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Method and Analytical Procedures 
 
Data 
 Description of the sample and case materials. The analysis is based on 
information from reviews of capital murder trials in North Carolina. These cases were 
located through LexisNexis searches of North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of 
Appeals cases. In these trials, the defendants were convicted of, or pled guilty to, first 
degree murder, the state sought the death penalty, the trial progressed to a sentencing 
phase whereby the jury heard evidence concerning aggravating and mitigating factors, 
and the jury issued a binding recommendation for a sentence. In making a sentencing 
recommendation, North Carolina capital juries have only two options, a death sentence or 
a sentence of life in prison, currently one without the possibility of parole except by the 
governor’s clemency. Included in the analyses are cases where the sentencing phase was 
conducted, but the jury declared that they could not reach the required unanimous 
decision regarding a sentence (in essence, a “deadlocked jury”), resulting in the default 
sentence of life in prison. 
 Reviews of capital trials were derived from public records materials that 
accompany decisions regarding appeals of capital murder convictions rendered by the 
North Carolina Supreme Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals. These materials 
include defendant and state briefs, as well as a form completed by the jury that records its 
responses to aggravating and mitigating factors, and concludes with the jury’s sentencing 
recommendation. Historically, these materials have been published in hard-copy form 
and placed in two university law libraries in North Carolina (the University of North 
Carolina – Chapel Hill and Wake Forest University), while other locations have 
microfilm copies. Beginning with decisions returned from cases tried in 1999, hard 
copies have not been made available, but materials are accessible via an electronic data 
file (http://www.ncappellatecourts.org). 
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 There are 818 cases in the dataset from trials held during the period 1979-2000. 
The initial year of 1979 represents the first year following the Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 
decision that death sentences were likely to be sustained upon appeal to the North 
Carolina Supreme Court. The year 2000 represents the latest year for which Supreme or 
Appeals Court decisions have been issued for the substantial majority of appeals filed. Of 
these, 741 cases are original trials while 86 are retrials following a vacating of either the 
defendant’s conviction and/or death sentence. 
 Because there is no centralized source of information regarding capital murder 
trials in North Carolina, it is impossible to determine the precise number of all capital 
murder trials conducted during the period under investigation. However, appeals of death 
sentences are automatically referred to the state Supreme Court. Also, a large proportion 
of defendants receiving a life sentence appeal their first degree murder convictions to the 
state Court of Appeals. If the Court of Appeals decision is not in their favor, defendants 
may appeal to the state Supreme Court, but that court has the option of declining to hear 
the case. Given that the substantial majority of capital cases are appealed to at least one 
of these courts, we estimate that the available data contain reviews of 80-90% of all 
sentencing recommendations made by juries during this period. 
 There are two instances were defendants are unlikely to appeal, and therefore not 
be included in the dataset. First, if they pled guilty and received a life sentence, there is 
little basis for appeal. Second, some defendants’ convictions are upheld, but their death 
sentences vacated. If, upon retrial of the penalty phase, they receive a life sentence, there 
is no basis for appeal. Both of these situations result in cases that are difficult to discover, 
especially if the trials were held in smaller rural counties without a major news outlet. A 
much smaller basis for some trials not included in the dataset involved those that were 
actually identified, but their case materials were not available because hard copies were 
missing from both libraries or not yet posted in electronic form (n = 12 cases). 
 Of the 818 cases reviewed, 598 had complete information necessary for the 
analyses. The pre-McKoy dataset consists of 210 cases and the post-McKoy dataset 
consists of 388 cases. 
Several sources of missing data have been determined that resulted in cases being 
excluded from the working dataset. These sources include: 
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• Cases that did not have a full set of materials necessary for review. Specifically, a 
number of appeals in cases where the individual received a life sentence did not 
include the jury recommendation form (termed “Issues and Recommendation”) 
among the case materials. Therefore, it was impossible to determine the specific 
aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors submitted for jury consideration. 
• Also excluded from the analysis are trials that involved two types of situations 
emerging from the jury deliberations. First, the jury did not find an aggravating 
factor. Second, the jury found an aggravating circumstance to exist, but judged that it 
did not merit the death penalty. In either case, the sentencing decision defaults to life, 
and the deliberations conclude prior to considering mitigating evidence. 
• In the early post-Gregg years of capital trials in North Carolina, the juries of some 
counties were submitted a set of mitigators and were asked if they accepted any of 
those listed. Thus, the acceptance or rejection of individual mitigators was not 
required, rendering these cases invalid for this analysis 
• Finally, some appeals were prepared in a manner that did not allow for coding of all 
variables used in the analysis. That is, descriptions of the crime were lacking in detail, 
or materials were excluded that were necessary to complete some codings. 
 Defendant information. Defendants’ age, race, and sex were available from the 
North Carolina Department of Corrections website, http://www.doc.state.nc.us/offenders. 
 Victim information. Through 1996, victims’ age, race, and sex were taken from a 
commercially available CD-ROM, North Carolina Vita Records: Deaths 1968-1996. For 
1997-2000, victims’ demographic information was determined from some combination of 
court material (such as reference to the victim in the state’s or defendant’s appeals 
briefs), newspaper accounts, or obituaries obtained through World Wide Web search 
engines. Cases for which this information could not be obtained are not included in the 
dataset. 
Description of Variables Used in the Analysis 
 Dependent variable. The dependent variable for the analysis is whether or not the 
jury assessed the defendant a sentence of death. For all cases, life sentences are coded as 
“0” while death sentences are coded as “1.” 
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 Focus variables: Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances. The main focus of 
this study is on the effect of the McKoy v. North Carolina decision (1990), which 
changed the unanimity requirement for mitigating circumstances, and how it affected the 
sentencing outcomes in capital murder trial. North Carolina is a “weighing” state in 
which the jury must weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in 
making a sentencing decision. Mitigating circumstances are defined as: “a fact or group 
of facts which do not constitute any justification or excuse for killing or reduce it to a 
lesser degree of the crime of first-degree murder, but which may be considered as 
extenuating, or reducing the moral culpability of the killing, or making it less deserving 
of the extreme punishment than are other first degree murders” (North Carolina Capital 
Punishment Statutes, p. 148). 
The North Carolina Capital Punishment Statutes identify 11 statutory aggravating 
circumstances in the order as they appear in the statutes. These are: 
1. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an 
aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, any homicide, 
robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy 
or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging or a destructive device or 
bomb. 
2. The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. 
3. The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 
4. The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of 
conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission 
by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or 
persons. 
5. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one 
person by means of a weapon or device, which would normally be hazardous 
to the lives of more than one person. 
6. The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or 
threat of violence to the person or had been previously adjudicated delinquent 
in a juvenile proceeding for committing an offense that would be a Class A, 
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B1, B2, C, D, or E felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person 
if the offense had been committed by an adult. 
7. The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated. 
8. The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony or had 
been previously adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for 
committing an offense that would be a capital felony if committed by an adult. 
9. The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a 
lawful arrest or affecting an escape from custody. 
10. The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of 
any governmental function or the enforcement of the laws. 
11. The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, 
employee of the Department of Corrections, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, 
former judge or justice, prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, 
or witness or former witness against the defendant, while engaged in the 
performance of his official duties or because of the exercise of his official 
duty” (North Carolina Capital Punishment Statutes). 
 North Carolina also provides a list with nine statutory mitigating circumstances, 
            which are the following: 
1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 
2. The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of mental or emotional disturbance. 
3. The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
4. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired. 
5. The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony 
committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. 
6. The defendant acted under the duress or under the domination of another 
person. 
7. The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified 
truthfully  on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony. 
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8. The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct 
or  consented to the homicidal act 
9.  Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to 
have mitigating value (known as the “catchall” factor). 
 The prosecution must prove the existence of the aggravating circumstance or  
circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and the aggravating circumstances must be found  
unanimously by the jury. In contrast to the aggravating circumstances, mitigating  
circumstances must only be proven to the satisfaction of an individual juror. Pre-McKoy, 
the mitigating circumstances had to be found unanimously by the jury. 
For the analysis, aggravation was measured as a summed variable consisting of 
the numbers of aggravators accepted by the jury. Mitigation was measured as the sum of 
the eight statutory variables (described above) accepted by the jury and the sum of all 
non-statutory mitigators accepted by the jury; the latter count included any “yes” 
responses to the catchall question.1 The range of aggravators accepted was 1 – 9. The 
range of mitigators accepted was 1 – 44.  
Control Variables. To determine whether any results would hold when taking into 
account the effects of other variables shown by past research to predict death sentencing, 
a set of control variables employed a number of control variables based on previous 
research were included. Some of these were additional variables could be interpreted as 
additional legal factors that could legitimately influence jury decisions, either by further 
aggravating or mitigating the case.  These variables were: 
• multiple victims (coded 1 if the case had multiple murder victims) 
• urban or rural county in which the trial was held (coded 1 if an urban county) 
• whether the defendant confessed (coded 1 if the defendant confessed). 
 Another set of variables were included to capture the possible effect of non-legal 
factors influencing sentencing outcomes. Those included are, by far, the most prominent 
non-legal variables studied in the post-Gregg literature, and have been found in a 
majority (but not all) studies to emerge as predictors of death sentencing. Comprised of 
demographic characteristics of defendants and victims, these variables are:   
• race of the defendant (coded 1 for white defendants, 0 for black and other 
defendants) 
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• age of the defendant (interval variable ranging from 15-77)2 
• race of the victim (coded 1 for white victims, 0 for black and other victims) 
• sex of the victim (coded 1 for male victims, 0 for female victims) 
• age of the victim (interval variable ranging from 0 to 100) 
Statistical Analysis 
The analysis consists of two parts, development of descriptive statistics and a 
multivariate analysis. The descriptive statistics give an overview about the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented to and accepted by capital juries and 
where they have changed, if at all, as result of the McKoy decision. A logistic regression 
analysis examines the extent to which these changes, if any, have influenced capital 
sentencing outcomes. The logistic regression analysis consists of three models: (1) a 
model for the total dataset including 598 cases with a variable in the model indicating 
whether a case was pre- or post-McKoy; (2) a model for the pre-McKoy dataset including 
210 cases; and (3) a model for the post-McKoy dataset including 388 cases. The logistic 
regression analysis allows for a comparison of the change in the impact of mitigating 
circumstances post-McKoy. A comparison of the models also allows for assessing the 
impact of the legally relevant variables of aggravation and mitigation, while controlling 
for nine other variables on the sentencing outcome pre- and post-McKoy. 
Logistic regression can be used when the dependent variable (life or death 
sentence) is a binary variable. Logistic regression estimates the impact of the independent 
variables on the odds that a defendant would receive a sentence of death. The odds ratio 
measures the strength and direction of the independent variables on the probability of a 
death sentence. The odds refer to the probability of an event occurring (death sentence) 
divided by the probability of an event not occurring (no death sentence). The odds can 
take values between 0 and ∞. The odds ratio determines whether the probability of a 
certain event (ex. death sentence) is the same for 2 groups (e.g. white and black 
defendants). The odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of an event occurring for one group 
(e.g. the odds of a death sentence occurring for white defendants) divided by the odds of 
an event occurring for another group (e.g. the odds of a death sentence occurring for 
black defendants). An odds ratio of a 1 indicates that an event is equally likely in both 
groups. When an odds ratio is greater than 1 it indicates that the odds of getting a 1 on the 
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dependent variable increases when the independent variable increases. When an odds 
ratio is between 0 and 1 it indicates that the odds of getting a 1 on the dependent variable 
decreases when the independent variable increases (Menard, 1995). 
The size of the effects of the independent variables on the probability of a death 
sentence is reported through the coefficients (b) of the independent variables. For 
instance, if the coefficient (b) for the number of aggravating circumstances accepted is 
.857 and the odds ratio is 2.356, this means that every additional aggravating 
circumstance accepted increases the probability of a death sentence by 240 percent 
(2.356 rounded). If the coefficient has a negative value, the odds ratio would mean that 
with every additional circumstance accepted the probability of a death sentence decreases 
by 240 percent. An independent variable is said to have a statistically significant effect if 
that variable contributes to the prediction of the probability of a death sentence beyond a 
contribution that might be due to chance. A probability of .05, or 1 in 20, is low enough 
to be thought of as statistically significant. The interpretation of the results will be based 
on whether the legally relevant variables are shown to be statistically significant and, 
based on their relative probabilities, whether they are more or less important as predictors 
of death sentencing during the periods before and after the McKoy decision. 
Endnotes 
 1The influence of the single aggravating and mitigating factors was tested, but due 
to the small number of submitted and accepted single aggravating and mitigating factors 
we created a summed variable (number of aggravating circumstances). 
 2Arguably, this variable could also serve as a mitigator because juries may decide 
that the youth (or even older ages)of the defendant serves to lessen culpability. However, 
all other things being equal, as they are in treated in the statistical analysis to follow, it 
could also be argued that age, like race and/or sex, is an ascribed status that should not be 
a determinant of sentencing decisions. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Results 
 
 
The first aspect of the periods before and after the McKoy v. North Carolina 
(1990) decision is whether their has been an apparent shift in the total number of 
mitigating circumstances both presented by the defense and accepted by the jury. An 
assumption would be that eliminating the unanimity requirement would present the 
defense with greater latitude in presenting mitigators, knowing that they only have to 
convince one juror of that factor’s relevance to the case. This assumption is supported by 
the results shown in Table 1 where the average number of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances presented to and accepted by the jury for 210 pre-McKoy cases and 388 
post-McKoy cases is presented. While the aggravating circumstances presented and 
accepted have increased only slightly in the post-McKoy era, the number of mitigating 
circumstances presented has more than doubled post-McKoy, increasing from 9.12 to 
20.6, and likewise, the average number accepted increased from 4.31 to 10.46. 
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Table 1 
Average Number of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances Presented and Accepted Pre- and Post-McKoy 
 Presented  Accepted 
 Pre-McKoy Post McKoy  Pre-McKoy Post McKoy 
Total Number of Aggravating Circumstances 2.04 2.45  1.81 2.25 
Total Number of Mitigating Circumstances 9.12 20.61  4.31 10.46 
 a) Statutory Mitigating Circumstances 2.3 2.86  0.97 1.4 
 b) Non-Statutory Mitigating Circumstances 6.82 17.75  3.34 9.06 
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Table 1 also presents the average number of statutory versus non-statutory 
mitigating circumstances presented and accepted. Pre-McKoy defense counsel presented 
on average 2.3 statutory mitigating circumstances and the jury, under the pre-McKoy 
unanimity requirement, accepted .97. Furthermore, post-McKoy 2.86 statutory mitigating 
circumstances were presented and 1.4 were accepted. This finding demonstrates a slight 
increase in the number of statutory mitigating circumstances both presented and accepted 
post-McKoy. 
Regarding non-statutory mitigating circumstances, pre-McKoy defense counsel 
presented on average 6.82 and the jury accepted 3.34 of them. In contrast, post-McKoy 
defense counsel introduced on average 17.75 non-statutory mitigating circumstances and 
the jurors accepted 9.06 of them. These results show clear increases in the number of 
non-statutory mitigating circumstances presented and accepted post-McKoy. 
Interestingly, Table 1 also demonstrates an increase in the average number of 
aggravating circumstances both introduced and accepted post-McKoy despite the fact that 
the Court’s decision did not change the interpretation of how aggravating circumstances 
should be considered by the jury. One possible explanation for this jump in the average 
number of aggravating circumstances presented post-McKoy by prosecutor’s may be a 
strategic attempt to combat the larger number of mitigating circumstances being 
presented by defense counsels. 
Because the number of both statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances 
presented and accepted has more than doubled post-McKoy, it is possible that mitigating 
circumstances might have a greater influence on capital sentencing outcomes by 
decreasing the probability of a death sentence. Logistic regression was used to model the 
determinants of capital sentencing, and, in turn, test this hypothesis. 
The results of these logistic regression analyses are presented in Table 2. Three 
models are presented; one is for the total sample of capital cases and one each for cases 
sentenced both pre-McKoy and post-McKoy. The logistic regression model for the total 
sample includes a dichotomous variable to distinguish between pre-McKoy and post-
McKoy cases (post-McKoy = 1). Surveying the results, this model indicates that the 
McKoy decision had an impact on capital sentencing outcomes because of the effect of 
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this dichotomous, pre- vs. post-McKoy variable attains statistical significance (b = .871, p 
< .001). However, the effect of this variable is positive and indicates that the odds of 
receiving a death sentence were 2.4 times higher in the post-McKoy era. While the 
McKoy decision theoretically presented defendants with a greater opportunity to sway 
jurors through mitigation, the results indicate that, all other things being equal, post-
McKoy defendants were actually at greater risk of receiving a death penalty. 
 
 33
Table 2 
Logistic Regression Model 
 
Variable Total 
 
Pre-McKoy Post-McKoy Differences in 
Effects 
 b se(b) Odds Ratio b se(b) Odds Ratio b se(b) Odds Ratio Z p 
            
Post-McKoy 
cases 
 .871** .227 2.389 N.A. N.A N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Aggravators 
Accepted 
 .857** .119 2.356  .475* .194 1.608 1.059** .164 2.885 2.30* .022 
Mitigators 
Accepted 
-.098** .014   .906 -.181** .044   .835  -
.098** 
.016   .907 1.77 .076 
Multiple 
Victims 
 .034 .226 1.034  .103 .372 1.108  -.069 .308   .993 -.356 .718 
Confession  .079 .051 1.083  .416* .152 1.515  -.011 .061   .989 -2.61* .008 
Defendant 
Age 
 .028* .011 1.028 -.005 .018   .995   .055** .017 1.057  2.42* .016 
Defendant 
Race (Non-
White) 
-.153 .232   .858 -.152 .381   .859  -.127 .311   .881   .051 .960 
Victim Age -.016* .005   .985 -.015 .008   .985  -.017* .007   .983 -.188 .850 
Victim Sex  .405* .202 1.500 -.009 .329   .991   .678* .269 1.971  1.62 .106 
Victim Race 
(White) 
 .331 .247 1.392  .258 .415 1.294   .369 .320 1.447  .212 .842 
County -.425* .205   .653 -.309 .335   .734   -.526 .280   .591  -.497 .624 
Intercept -1.220 .558   .295  .623 .909 1.864 -1.389 .737   .059   
 
-2 Log Likelihood  intercept              783.446                                       286.227                                                      492.066        
                                model                 622.597                                       235.378                                                      359.634 
Model X2                                            160.849                                         50.849                                                     132.432   
Corrected R2                                             .323                                             .289                                                          .402   
N                                                                598                                              210                                                           388 
*p < .05;   **p < .001    
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The logistic regression model for the total data set also shows that the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances accepted by the jury are related to capital 
sentencing outcomes in a manner consistent with their legal function. That is, the greater the 
number of aggravating circumstances accepted by the jury, the greater the likelihood of a 
death sentence (b =  .857, p < .001). Conversely, the greater the number of mitigating 
circumstances accepted by the jury, the lower the likelihood of a death sentence (b = -.098, p 
< .001). In fact, each additional aggravating circumstance accepted by the jury increases the 
odds of a death sentence by a multiple of 2.36, while each additional mitigating circumstance 
accepted by the jury reduces the odds of a death sentence by approximately 9%. 
The results from this first model presented in Table 2 suggest that several extra-legal 
variables also significantly influence sentencing outcomes. First, defendants in urban 
counties are 34.7% less likely to receive a death sentence than defendants in rural counties. 
Second, murderers of female victims were 1.5 times more likely to receive a death sentence 
than murderers of male victims. Third, killers of younger victims have a higher probability of 
receiving a death sentence (b =-.016, p < .05). The age of the defendant also significantly 
influences sentencing outcomes -- the younger the defendant, the less likely the probability of 
a death sentence (b = .028, p < .05). The effects of multiple victims, defendant race, victim 
race, and confession failed to attain statistical significance. 
While these data do not measure the weights given to the various aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances accepted by capital juries in North Carolina, they do show that 
numerous mitigating circumstances may be required to overcome even a small number of 
aggravating circumstances. Because the McKoy decision reduced the burden to the defense at 
penalty phase for jurors accepting mitigating circumstances, it is possible that the influence 
of aggravating and/or mitigating circumstance on capital case sentencing outcomes in North 
Carolina varies across these two capital sentencing eras. To address this possibility, two 
additional logistic regression models are presented in Table 2. To reiterate, the pre-McKoy 
model is based on 210 capital cases sentenced while the post-McKoy model is based on 388 
capital cases sentenced. 
The pre- and post-McKoy models presented in Table 2 both show that increases in the 
number of mitigating factors accepted by capital jurors decrease the probability of a death 
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sentence. However, contrary to what might be expected, mitigating circumstances have less 
impact on sentencing outcomes post-McKoy. In the pre-McKoy era, each additional 
mitigating circumstance accepted by the jury decreased the probability of a death sentence by 
16.5%. In the post-McKoy era, each additional mitigating circumstance accepted decreased 
the probability of a death sentence by only 9.3%. Table 2 also reports the results of a test for 
the equality of pre- and post-McKoy model coefficients (Brame, Paternoster, Mazerolle, and 
Piquero, 1998). The differences in the effects of the impact of number of mitigating 
circumstances accepted pre- and post-McKoy are statistically significant (difference = 1.77), 
reinforcing the finding that mitigating factors appear to have less of an effect in the post-
McKoy era. 
Conversely, the impact of the number of aggravating circumstances accepted on 
sentencing outcomes was much stronger post-McKoy than pre-McKoy. For both the pre- and 
post-McKoy model, as expected, an increasing number of aggravating circumstances 
accepted were significantly associated with a greater probability of a death sentence. In the 
pre-McKoy model, each additional aggravating circumstance accepted increased the odds of a 
death sentence by a multiple of 1.6. In the post-McKoy model each additional aggravating 
circumstance accepted increased the odds of a death sentence by a multiple of 2.89. The 
difference in these effects (difference = 2.30) was statistically significant. 
Even though the number of mitigating circumstances doubled post-McKoy, the 
impact of mitigating circumstances on sentencing outcomes decreased; moreover, the 
influence of aggravating factors and the probability of a death sentence both increased during 
the post-McKoy period. These findings are contrary to any expectation that the increased 
latitude in having mitigators accepted may have resulted in decreased death sentencing. In 
practical terms, the McKoy decision may have inspired defense counsel to submit more 
mitigating factors at penalty phase, and it made jury acceptance of these mitigators more 
likely by eliminating the unanimity requirement, but the weight or influence of these 
additional mitigators appears to have been very slight. Moreover, their presence may have 
diluted or diminished the influence of other more salient mitigators. In turn, the influence of 
aggravating circumstances may have increased and the odds of a death sentence became 
more likely as a consequence. 
 36
These pre- and post-McKoy models presented in Table 2 also provide additional 
evidence of the extent to which the death penalty may have been applied arbitrarily and/or 
capriciously in North Carolina. In the pre-McKoy model, only the effects of three legally 
relevant variables attained statistical significance: number of aggravating circumstances 
accepted, number of mitigating circumstances accepted, and confession. None of effects of 
the extra-legal variables attained statistical significance. Conversely, in the post-McKoy 
model, five variables attain significance. Three of these variables are legally relevant to the 
sentencing decision, the number of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances accepted, 
and defendant age. The other two variables that attained significance were quasi-legal 
variables. First, as victim’s age increased, the odds of a death sentence decreased. Second, 
murderers of female victims were twice as likely to receive a death sentence as murderers of 
male victims. 
These findings suggest that the death penalty in North Carolina shows no clear and 
convincing evidence of arbitrariness nor capriciousness during either the pre-McKoy or the 
post-McKoy eras. The results shown in Table 2 reveal that legal factors are the primary 
predictors of death sentencing. Although the results make clear that aggravating 
circumstances are much stronger predictors of a death sentence compared to mitigating. 
While both defendant and victim age are included among the statistically significant 
variables these can be argued as being relevant to the sentencing decision and cannot be 
necessarily be construed as evidence of caprice relevant to the sentencing decision and could 
not be construed as evidence of caprice. However, the significant effect of victim’s sex 
during the post-McKoy era suggests that some level of gender-based bias may be present. 
Although beyond the scope of the present study, this effect might be attributed to female-
victim murders in which rape was involved, a single aggravator that may carry special weight 
in tilting the jury’s decision toward a death sentence. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Discussion and Recommendations for Future Research 
 
 
Summarizing the Results 
In McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), the Court increased jurors’ discretion in capital 
sentencing by holding that jurors do not have to find mitigating circumstances unanimously, 
but that each juror can find the mitigating circumstances he/she believes to be present. This 
decision provided the basis for our primary research question, which was whether the McKoy 
(1990) decision influenced the way in which aggravating and mitigating circumstances are 
processed in North Carolina. The focus of the Court on individualized sentencing also 
represents the basis for a related question as to whether or not the death penalty system in 
North Carolina operates arbitrarily, meaning the legally relevant variables of aggravation and 
mitigation fail to determine the probability of a death sentence. 
Since each juror can now find mitigating circumstances independent of the other 
jurors in the post-McKoy era, it was expected that the number of mitigating circumstances 
presented and accepted would increase. This expectation is supported by the descriptive 
statistics, which showed that the average number of mitigating circumstances presented and 
accepted doubled in the post-McKoy cases. At the same time, the number of aggravating 
circumstances presented and submitted stayed about the same. The analysis then moved to a 
consideration of the impact of mitigating circumstances, and whether there had been a 
change between the two eras. Separate logistic regression analyses revealed that there had 
indeed been a shift in the effects of aggravation and mitigation, but not the manner that some 
might have anticipated. Specifically, in the post-McKoy era, mitigating circumstances were 
found to have a diminished impact on the probability of a death sentence while, conversely, 
aggravating circumstances carried an increased impact. 
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Discussion of the Results 
The findings of this study suggest that even though the number of mitigating 
circumstances accepted has doubled post-McKoy, they have less influence on the probability 
of a death sentence. One possible explanation could be a diffusion effect. In essence, even 
though jurors accept twice as many mitigating circumstances post-McKoy, the accepted 
mitigating circumstances seem to carry less weight. Jurors are presented with on average 20 
mitigating circumstances by the defense counsel in the post-McKoy era. The jurors might 
have the impression that defense attorneys present anything they possibly can because there 
is not a specific reason why the defendant does not deserve to die. As an extension of this 
thinking, jurors might believe that if the defendant has a good reason why he should not die, 
he would not need to submit so many mitigating circumstances. 
Ironically, the decreased relevance of mitigating circumstances post-McKoy could 
also be caused by the abandonment of the unanimity requirement for mitigating 
circumstances that was dictated in McKoy v. North Carolina. In the pre-McKoy era, jurors 
had to find mitigating circumstances unanimously and when they did, these circumstances 
were probably very salient and carried significant weight. In the post-McKoy era, jurors do 
not have to agree on the same circumstance and therefore it may be that the “accepted 
mitigating circumstances” are not given the same weight. Jurors may engage in fewer 
discussions about whether or not to accept a certain mitigating circumstance; therefore, each 
juror is left to decide for her/himself self whether to accept the mitigator, and the approval of 
the other jurors is not necessary. If the jurors do not discuss the importance of a mitigating 
factor together, those who do not initially agree with it are unlikely to consider it when it 
comes time to vote for the sentence. 
A second research question referred to the issue of arbitrariness and whether legally 
relevant variables determine the sentencing outcome. The logistic regression analysis 
indicates that North Carolina sentencing outcomes appear to have been significantly 
influenced by the legally relevant variables of aggravation and mitigation. The analysis, 
however, also suggests that even though the number of mitigating circumstances accepted 
significantly decreases the probability of a death sentence, the impact of mitigating 
circumstances is only marginal when compared to the impact of aggravating circumstances, 
especially post-McKoy. In the absence of guidance for jurors on how to weigh the 
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aggravating against the mitigating circumstances, and when everything counts in aggravation 
and mitigation, subjectivity appears to influence sentencing outcomes and invites arbitrary 
decision-making (Steiker and Steiker, 1995). 
In both time periods, jurors were given the opportunity for arbitrary decision-making 
by the state being allowed to submit vague statutory aggravating circumstances. Some of the 
statutory aggravating circumstances are so broad that they could be submitted in any first-
degree murder case. North Carolina employs the aggravating circumstance “murder was 
heinous and/or cruel,” which means that in some way the murder was worse than another and 
the defendant therefore deserves the death penalty. The terms “heinous and cruel” are very 
subjective and very open to interpretation. A similar broad statutory aggravating 
circumstance is “murder for pecuniary gain,” which can include anything from a robbery to a 
murder for hire, so has great latitude in its meaning. The statutory aggravating circumstance 
“capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in another felony” can also 
be applied to many other non-capital first degree murders. These examples show that there is 
a broad prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty among theoretically death-eligible 
cases and, when sought, if the jury accepts one or more aggravating circumstances, they have 
virtually unbridled discretion to impose a life or death sentence. Justice Potter Stewart wrote 
in Gregg v. Georgia (1976, p. 46) that “a system could have standards so vague that they 
would fall adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that 
a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman 
could occur.” The goal of narrowing the class of death eligible defendants and provide a 
consistent application of the death penalty is hard to achieve when almost any first-degree 
murder can be death-eligible by employing vague aggravating circumstances that make a 
defendant death-eligible. 
The current death penalty system may be deceptive because it creates the impression 
(some would say “illusion”) that the death penalty is administered fairly and non-arbitrarily. 
The Court has, over the past three decades, created a death penalty system that is highly 
discretionary, but generates the impression of a greatly regulated, supervised system. Steiker 
and Steiker (1995, p. 3) propose that the death penalty today “… is, perversely, both over- 
and under-regulated. The body of doctrine produced by the Court is enormously complex and 
its applicability to specific cases difficult to discern; yet, it remains unresponsive to the 
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central animating concerns that inspired the Court to embark on its regulatory regime in the 
first place. Indeed, most surprisingly, the overall effect of twenty-odd years of doctrinal 
head-banging has been to substantially reproduce the pre-Furman world of capital 
sentencing.” 
That said, one particular finding merits discussion because of the absence of an effect. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the most consistent findings in the post-Gregg death 
penalty literature concerning discrimination is a persistent race-of-victim effect found across 
a variety of studies. The impact of this much-reported effect is to increase significantly 
(although the magnitude varies from state to state) the likelihood of defendants receiving a 
death sentence when the victim is white. In contrast to this rather voluminous literature, none 
of the three models presented in Table 2 demonstrate this effect. It is noteworthy that the 
only other systematic analysis of North Carolina death sentencing in recent years is the 
research of Unah and Boger (2001) (see Chapter 3, especially Endnote 5). Their work 
attracted considerable attention upon its release because it purported to show a pronounced 
race-of-victim effect in North Carolina death sentencing practices whereby murderers of 
whites were more likely to receive a death sentence, even when controlling for legal factors 
of the cases. Careful scrutiny of their results reveals that this effect is found at the decision-
making levels of deciding to pursue a first degree murder charge and to seek the death 
penalty. However, in a little discussed portion of their report, the race-of-victim effect 
disappears at the trial level. To re-emphasize Chapter 3, Endnote 5, the years of Unah and 
Boger’s analysis were somewhat limited (1995-1999) and were all post-McKoy. It is of 
considerable interest that the similar findings discussed in this thesis are from much larger set 
of capital trials across a much broader span of years. This effect is more remarkable in the 
light of the fact that, if Unah and Boger’s findings are generalizable to the larger set of 
capital trials discussed here, juries have been, in effect, handed a set of cases in which a race-
of-victim effect is already embedded. Explanations why this effect disappears at the trial 
level – arguably the stage of the criminal justice process most subject to arbitrariness and 
capriciousness – are quite elusive, and will pose a considerable challenge for future 
researchers. 
Finally, one possibility exists that is difficult to ascertain, but the influence of which 
cannot be ruled out. Faced with the challenge of seeking the death penalty for defendants 
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who are entitled to more latitude in having the potentially mitigating aspects of their crimes 
considered, state prosecutors may have become more selective in their cases in the post-
McKoy era. That is, they are less likely to go forward with single-aggravator cases, and to 
pay more attention to what mitigation the defendant might present so that it can be more 
aggressively countered in the sentencing phase of the trial.  In addition, prosecutors may have 
gone to greater lengths to present strong cases to the jury so that the aggravators they present 
will carry more weight. In essence, the McKoy decision may have resulted in a conscious 
change in prosecutors’ presentation of aggravation, leading to an enhanced effect of these 
legal aspects of the cases. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
An acknowledged weakness of empirical death penalty studies using secondary 
analysis is that there are undoubtedly subtle variables that may influence decisions for which 
no controls are feasible. These include, but are not limited to, the demeanor of the defendant 
during the trial, the sheer quality of the prosecution and defense presentations, and the socio-
political environment surrounding the trial (e.g., the O. J. Simpson trial).   However, there are 
some other avenues for future suggested by this research that could be pursued, some of 
which are discussed in the paragraphs that follow. 
The decision-making of jurors has been assessed by the Capital Jury Project (“CJP”; 
see Bowers, 1995), a consortium consisting of criminologists, law faculty, and social 
psychologists. As part of the CJP, researchers interviewed between 80 and 120 former capital 
jurors from each of 14 states, including North Carolina (Luginbuhl and Howe, 1995). The 
interviews are open-ended about the “jurors experiences and decision-making over the course 
of the trial, identify points at which various influences come into play, and reveal the ways in 
which jurors reach their final sentencing decision” (Bowers, Fleury-Steiner, and Antonio, 
2003, p. 423). A major finding of the CJP is that jurors often do not correctly understand the 
sentencing instructions provided to them by the court, especially how the rules for 
considering mitigating circumstances are different from the rules for considering aggravating 
circumstances. Because the study is spread over a number of states, the numbers of cases 
studied in each state is relatively limited. A possibly useful avenue of exploration is to 
determine how widespread the misunderstandings of jurors were across a broad range of 
capital cases in North Carolina, and how this may have impacted their considerations of 
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aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The study could replicate some of the CJP 
methodology, but be tailored more specifically to the possible confusion generated by the 
seemingly obtuse wording that characterizes North Carolina’s “Issues and Recommendation” 
form.1 If such misunderstandings are indeed widespread, arbitrariness could enter in by virtue 
of the jurors erroneously believing that their options for voting life or death were limited, 
thus undermining the impact of the legal factors of the case.  Further, more extensive, 
research is needed to thoroughly explore this possibility. 
As a policy recommendation that would open up numerous opportunities for research, 
states could clarify the required weighing process by quantifying the weights given to single 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Although resolving the details would present a 
formidable challenge that is well beyond the scope of this thesis, a systematic quantification 
of the weighing process would give capital jurors considerably more guidance in their 
sentencing decision, thereby further reducing the unfettered discretion that was condemned in 
Furman v. Georgia (1972). Conceptually, the jurors would compare their scores assigned to 
aggravating to those assigned to mitigation and sentence accordingly. By quantifying the 
weighing process, the state could record not only which aggravating and mitigating factors 
were accepted, but also how much weight the jurors gave to each factor. That information 
would be useful for several reasons. First, the information about how jurors weighed the 
single aggravating and mitigating circumstances could be used by the state Supreme Court 
during the automatic appeal and proportionality review to ensure that the death penalty was 
not imposed arbitrarily. Second, in states where the judge has the right to override the 
sentencing recommendation of the jury (not the case in North Carolina), judges would be 
able to review how much weight was given to the single aggravating and mitigating factors, 
thus better informing their decisions to affirm or override the jury’s decision. 
Finally, researchers could also use the information gathered from quantitatively-
oriented jury studies of this nature to gain a better understanding of the decision-making 
process of the jurors. That information would also promote our understanding whether jurors 
react negatively to a high number of mitigating circumstances presented by defense counsel. 
Jurors may have the feeling that defense counsel admits anything in mitigation they can think 
of. Consequently, jurors may have the impression that the mitigating circumstances 
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submitted are meaningless and that the defense thinks that quantity is more important than 
quality. 
The suggested analysis would also promote our understanding whether jurors react 
negatively to a high number of mitigating circumstances presented by defense counsel. Jurors 
may have the feeling that defense counsel admits anything in mitigation they can think of. 
Consequently jurors may have the impression that the mitigating circumstances submitted are 
meaningless and that the defense thinks that quantity is more important than quality. 
Another avenue to explore is whether it is more effective for the defense counsel to 
concentrate on a few important mitigating factors that most of the jurors could agree upon, 
thereby maximizing their effect. Research of this nature could focus on whether the number 
of mitigators rejected serves as a predictor of death sentencing, or alternatively, whether the 
using ratio of submitted to accepted mitigators yields meaningful results. 
Concluding Thought 
As these suggestions indicate, there is still much work to be done in better 
determining capital punishment sentencing practices and in developing rational explanations 
for their existence. What cannot be resolved through empirical work alone is whether the 
system can ever be made just and fair enough, despite numerous efforts by state and federal 
courts, to continue a practice that has been abandoned by most of the industrial world. 
Endnote 
1Issue Three of the form asks “Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the mitigating circumstances or circumstance found by you is or are insufficient to 
outweigh the aggravating circumstance found by you?” while Issue Four poses the question 
“Do you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance you 
found is sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death penalty when considered 
with the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found by one or more of you?”. As a point 
of clarification, answering “yes” to Issue IV does not require the jury to impose a death 
sentence. But, answering “no” to either III or IV defaults to a life sentence. 
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